19571

BOOK REVIEWS

Not Guilty. By Judge Jerome Frank and Barbara Frank. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957. Pp. 261. $3.75.
According to Judge Frank's daughter and collaborator, final corrections in
the manuscript of this volume were made only two days before her father's
death. In Not Guilty, Judge Frank returned to issues which had frequently
engaged his attention in his earlier writings-the problems of procedural
efficiency and decency, the fallibility of the fact-finding process, and the
means by which the margin of institutional failure may be reduced. Illuminating the discussion is Judge Frank's old faith in the efficacy of human
intelligence to comprehend and solve human problems. There is the same
ill-concealed scorn for those who condemn the skeptical and inquiring mind
as dangerous or indecent. In his first book, Judge Frank wrote: "But just
in proportion as [one] learns more about what was previously unknown, he
reduces his chances of being crushed by unobserved dangers."' One must
not expect to find sympathy here for the view that we ought not to talk
about problems of convicting the innocent because this will "create public
2
cynicism and impair public confidence in the machinery of justice" (P. 37).
Not Guilty consists of a series of case histories of persons convicted of
criminal offenses in the United States, whose innocence was later established.
Accompanying the histories are comments analyzing the causes for the failures
of justice and suggesting solutions for the problems so identified. The concluding chapter is given over entirely to comment and summary. Barbara
Frank tells us that she was primarily responsible for preparation of the case
narratives and Judge Frank of the comments but that each author contributed to the other's work. While, in what follows, I shall attribute most of
what is said to Judge Frank, this will be done for convenience and with full
recognition that the book is the product of joint authorship.
A book dealing with such subject matter and employing such a technique
necessarily invites comparison with Borchard's classic work, Convicting the
Innocent, published just a quarter-century ago. It must be admitted that
there are many points in common. The general plan of the Franks' book is
strikingly similar. Both books discuss many of the same problems and agree
at many points in analysis and recommendations. But there are differences.
None of the cases discussed by the Franks appeared in the earlier volume.
Most occurred after the Borchard book was published. But the contributions
of Not Guilty are not simply cumulative. At many points Judge Frank's
comments are fuller and contain a greater thrust. Moreover, the new book is
more obviously directed to a lay audience than Borchard's rather formidable
volume. It is only about half as large. In none of his writings did Judge Frank
'Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 159 (1930).
Page references, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the volume under review.
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wear his learning so lightly. It is certainly worth recording that, apart from
a table of sources, not one footnote is included!
If it were not already obvious enough, Not Guilty demonstrates that it is
possible for innocent persons to be convicted of serious crimes in the United
States, sometimes of capital offenses. In some cases the hazard is far from
remote. Certainly, the plight of the impoverished accused with a criminal
record, who is brought to trial for a crime which has produced community
outrage, presents a series of problems which has insufficiently engaged the
public conscience and concern. In looking over the materials which the Franks
present, one is inclined to conclude that the failures of justice related can be
largely attributed to three basic factors.
First is the problem of misidentification of the defendant by the victim or
other witnesses. The magnitude of the peril clearly emerges from Borchard's
work. But it is even more dramatically demonstrated in this volume. In some
thirty-six instances of conviction of the innocent presented by the Franks,
misidentification of the defendants played a part in about three-quarters of
them. In the case of Shepherd, a completely innocent man was twice convicted of forgery on the erroneous identification of witnesses and narrowly
escaped two other convictions for similar crimes, once by the failure of the
grand jury to indict and once by the confession of the true criminal while
charges were pending against Shepherd (Pp. 76-78). Strangely enough, the
importance of misidentification has provided comfort for those who complacently defend American law-enforcement procedures. Such failures of
justice, it is said, are the inevitable result of human fallibility about which
nothing significant can be done. But the Franks' volume demonstrates that
many of the errors are not inevitable. Some stem from innocent, but unenlightened, identification procedures of the police. For all our ignorance,
enough is known about the processes of perception, memory, and bias to
make important improvements in such procedures as the line-up and other
identification devices. But not all the mistakes are innocent. Instances of
police and prosecution coaching of witnesses occur. In the Majczek case the
chief prosecuting witness was apparently coerced into a misidentification of
the defendant under a threat of retaliatory prosecution directed against her.
Such examples are fortunately rare. But all too often both police and prosecutors are too easily satisfied with statements of witnesses identifiying the
suspected party as the culprit and, as a result, fail to make thorough investigations of defendants' alibis or other circumstances favorable to the defense.
Second is the problem of poverty. Men are convicted-no one knows how
many-whose "only crime is that of being poor" (P. 86). The appointment
of counsel for indigent defendants is a necessary, but only a small, part of
the solution. For, assuming that the appointed lawyer is highly competent
(many are not), a defendant may find himself helpless for lack of funds
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to search out witnesses or documents or to employ competent expert witnesses.
This volume provides a wealth of examples. 3 It should be realized that the
problem of inadequate means is not simply that of those defendants who are
totally indigent, but extends to those who have enough to employ counsel
and little more. Such a defendant lacks the resources for investigation,
limited as they are, which are sometimes made available to the pauper by a
public defender's office. Thus, Judge Frank asserts, "The innocent whitecollar defendant in a large city is ... ordinarily, more likely to be convicted
than if he were wholly destitute" (P. 89). Only recently, the Supreme Court
of the United States has held in Griffin v. Illinois, 4 that a state may not deny
a convicted criminal the right to ordinary appellate review because of his
lack of means to supply a stenographic transcript of trial proceedings. Curiously enough, some have seen in the Griffin holding a bold and radical step.
On the contrary, it hardly scratches the surface.
The third broad consideration which goes far to explain these failures of
criminal justice is the fact that in the American culture, law-enforcement
officers are often supplied motives which lead to results other than the conviction of the guilty and acquittal of the innocent. In some regrettable instances,
peculiarly outrageous crimes have resulted in a demand on the part of the
public and the officials that someone-anyone-be made to suffer in consequence. Such a spirit seems to underlie the conviction of Majczek in Illinois,
where the victim of the murder was a policeman. Perhaps the most remarkable
expression of this view is that of Mississippi Governor Bilbo, related by
Borchard. One Thomas Gunter was convicted of murder. Later, after Gunter
was incarcerated in prison, the victim's wife confessed to the crime, pleaded
guilty and was given a suspended sentence. Bilbo denied Gunter's application
for pardon with this cogent statement:
Somebody ought to be in the penitentiary all the time for the murder of a sleeping
man. If Judge Pegram does not believe Mrs. Drew is guilty enough to serve her term,
then the man convicted of the murder will have to serve his term.
Husbands ought to have some protection. 5
Certainly, it is true that insistent public demand for convictions in shocking
cases, often fanned to flame by the press, produces pressures on the officials
which, when yielded to, as they sometimes are, result in extreme instances
of abuse, such as third-degree tactics by the police, and the withholding of
evidence by the prosecution. The facts that American public prosecutors are
elected officials and that a record of convictions by a "tough" prosecutor has
often proved to be the royal road to political advancement have also played
' Consult, e.g., the case of Shepherd, pp. 74-78.
'351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5
Borchard, Convicting the Innocent 344 (1932).
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their part. For whatever reasons, the processes leading to criminal convictions
strongly resemble trial-by-battle in many American jurisdictions, even though
infinitely more civilized and sophisticated procedures characterize the trial of
civil cases in the same states. Judge Frank notes that only in the United States
among the civilized nations of the world is discovery not granted as a matter
of course in criminal cases (Pp. 243-49). Frequently the defendant cannot
even procure before trial a copy of the confession he is alleged to have made
nor examine the pellets which he is alleged to have shot into the body of the
victim. Surely, Judge Frank is correct in regarding criminal discovery as an
inherent part of any rational system of criminal justice and our failure to
provide it as inconsistent with our desire that "criminal trials ...

reveal the

truth as far as is humanly possible, to bring about the acquittal of innocent
persons and not to remain a sporting adventure" (P. 245).
These problems are discussed in Judge Frank's commentary. But many
other features of American criminal procedure fall under his lash. He attacks
the niggardly and unsystematic provision for making compensation to those
who are convicted and whose innocence is later established (Pp. 117-18).
He denounces the rule which permits the prosecution to communicate defendant's past criminal record to the jury under the guise of "impeaching" crossexamination (P. 114). He would liberalize the rules relating to right of counsel so that they might take fuller account of the inadequacy of defendant's
representation when the lawyer was hired by defendant rather than being
appointed by the court (P. 34). He would not permit a criminal conviction
based on perjury to stand even though there be no proof that the prosecution
made "knowing use" of perjured evidence (P. 116).
Certainly, one does not turn to a book like this to obtain a full and balanced picture of American criminal justice. This book is a history of failures,
and all is not failure. Moreover, the failures are not all of one sort. Much
might be written of those defects in the system which, while serving no
rational purpose, permit the guilty to escape. But the problems which the
authors chose to discuss are those of convicting the innocent. It would be
difficult rationally to deny the substantial accuracy of the authors' indictment
of our system, both in general and in particular. Indeed, one may feel that
in advancing measures of reform, Judge Frank sometimes does not go far
enough. His specific remedy for the third degree, for example, seems to be
the recruiting of a higher quality police force "like [the] FBI." Improvement
in the quality of police personnel is, of course, indispensable to the solution of
this and other problems. But one suspects that elimination of the third degree
may ultimately require more. 6
Protection of the innocent from criminal punishment is a vital consideration
' Consult Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 16, 34-35 (1953).
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to any society. But it becomes a matter of most critical importance in periods
of crisis when the very life of the community depends upon the apprehension
of wrongdoers and the prevention of their depredations. The state trials of
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England demonstrate that a system of
criminal justice which is incapable of separating the innocent from the
guilty not only produces human tragedy, but is itself a threat to the state's
security. The enormity of the incidents surrounding the so-called Popish Plot
of the 1670's lies not alone in the fact that the perjured testimony of Titus
Oates sent a dozen or more innocent men to their doom. It also lies in the
fact that the weaknesses of the system prevented the detection of the very
real peril to the state which, in fact, existed. Judge Frank's book is thus not
simply an exercise in humanitarian sentiment. It deals with problems which
in enlightened self-interest we had better solve.
FRANcis A. ALLEN*
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

Administrative Law. By Morris D. Forkosch. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1956. Pp. xiv, 856. $17.50.
There was a time when the teacher of administrative law could warn his
students that there were no systematic treatises on administrative law and
that salvation lay in close attention to the case-book and the instructor, plus
the saving grace of a few law review articles. Early works by Goodnow and
Freund drew upon comparative law to suggest there was such a thing as
administrative law in the United States.' Subsequent writers turned their attention to a "vertical" study of individual adminstrative agencies, 2 which culminated in the monographic studies of the federal agencies by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. 3 None of these were of great
use to the beleaguered student. Influenced perhaps by the organization of the
conventional administrative law case-books and the form taken by the Administrative Procedure Act, administrative law scholars have in recent years produced a number of "horizontal" studies of administrative law, which attempt
'E.g., Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law (1893); Freund, Administrative
Powers Over Persons and Property (1928). Goodnow, Principles of Administrative Law
(1905), contained material on "Officers" and "Local Administration" no longer considered
as part of Administrative Law.
2
E.g., Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission (1931) ; Henderson, The Federal
Trade Commission (1924) ; Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner (1927) ; Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation (1936).

'The twenty-seven monographs were prepared for the Attorney General's Committee in
1939 and 1940 by an investigating staff working under the direction of Walter Gellhorn and
including Kenneth C. Davis, both of whom have since made exceptional contributions to
administrative law.

